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Abstract 
 
Reason is a heterogeneous word with many meanings and functions. 
Instrumental reasoning is the ‘useful but blind’ variant that, for Horkheimer, 
presupposes ‘the adequacy of procedures for purposes more or less taken for 
granted and supposedly self-explanatory’. The paper argues that the root of 
instrumental reasoning is to be found in Hume and Weber and suggests that 
the problems associated with portraying reason as ‘inert’ or ‘formal’ underpin 
many areas of education policy today. A scrutiny of discourses on 
managerialism, skills and creativity suggests that they are not only bound by 
instrumental reasoning but tied to unacknowledged purposes associated with 
what Marcuse called ‘capitalist rationality’. The paper concludes by reflecting 
upon Habermas’ notion of substantive reasoning that offers education a way 
forward. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Reason has been cast in many moulds. From its useful but apparently 
purposeless wanderings in its instrumental form, to its attachment in Hegel to 
the Logos and a ‘cunning’ alignment to world history (Hegel, 1956, p.33); 
from its a-historical, culturally indifferent rendition in classical liberal 
epistemology, to its critical, ironic detachment in postmodernism, where some 
would accuse it of relativism or nihilistic indifference. The word is 
heterogeneous, a homonym, and its meanings have served different functions. 
Instrumental reason, the ‘useful but blind’ variant (McGuigan, 2006, p.171), is 
the one of interest here.  
 
It is a term that has been widely used in educational discourses. Skemp used 
it to make a distinction between ‘relational and instrumental understanding’ 
in pupil’s learning of mathematics (Skemp, 1976); Lankshear and Knobel to 
contrast new literacies with those of conventional or ‘instrumental value’ 
(Lankshear & Knobel, 2006); and Pickering to draw attention to ‘a highly 
instrumentalist approach to teaching’ as the profession adapts to the 
government’s programme for Masters qualifications in teaching and learning 
(Pickering, 2009). Too often, however, the term has been used as if it were 
unproblematic. At times it has been used literally: ‘Instrumentalism implies 
looking upon both school subjects and humans as instruments, as tools or 
means for reaching another goal or end’ (VarkØy, 2007), while at others it has 
been used incomprehensibly, at least to those outside the domain (e.g. Van 
Detta, 2004). The paper contends that literal and obscure renditions of 
instrumental reasoning foreclose upon more subtle issues associated with 
purpose and value and that its seemingly self-explanatory employment in 
areas of education policy has coincided with the ascendancy of neo-liberal 
economic practices within the UK and that this needs explaining. 
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Horkheimer is a key figure in the emergence of the term. In Eclipse of Reason 
he described it in terms of ‘the adequacy of procedures for purposes more or 
less taken for granted and supposedly self-explanatory. It attaches little 
importance to the question whether the purposes as such are reasonable’ 
(Horkheimer, 2004, p.3). Here he implies a distinction between reason as a 
content-free, value-neutral instrument, a tool that Schopenhauer cast as 
having ‘no material but only a formal content’ (Schopenhauer, 1974, p.171), 
and reason as having purposes and consequences within the world where 
actions and behaviours convey a normative component inextricably bound to 
its instrumental function. This is clearly Horkheimer’s position, for whom the 
purposes and ends of reasoning were an intimate guiding component of 
reasoning itself. An analogy makes the point: ‘Instrumental reasoners may 
show that it is necessary to break eggs if one wants to make an omelette, but 
they have nothing but ‘subjective’ or ‘arbitrary’ preferences to cite as reasons 
for making or not making omelettes’ (O’Neill, 1998). For O’Neill instrumental 
reasoners retreat to the ‘personal’ or ‘subjective’ domain when verifying 
decisions and deny the significance of wider purposes in deciding between 
issues of choice and value. Thus, to extend her analogy, while instrumental 
reasoning may be essential for the skilful and efficient preparation of 
omelettes, that the purpose is to embarrass a vegan or kill a cholesterol-laden 
diner, or connected with any explicit purpose apart from the ‘subjective’, is 
deemed unrelated and extraneous. Procedures are fundamental. Purposes are 
disconnected from or considered irrelevant to this form of reason. 
 
The next section examines the nature of instrumental reasoning in the 
philosophy of Hume while the subsequent one looks at its emergence in the 
social theory of Weber. The sections that follow use tensions that emerge to 
reflect upon three current educational discourses that employ reason 
instrumentally, namely, managerialism, skills and creativity. Section four 
argues that managerialism uses phrases like ‘the pursuit of excellence’ while 
failing to suggest what content or purpose such terms might serve as a 
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standard to judge the quality of a new Headteacher (DfES, 2004). Section five 
looks at the nature of communication as an instrumental skill that attempts to 
secrete a normative agenda. And section six looks at creativity as an 
ambiguous term used by central government to make inroads into education 
policy for the purposes of market innovation, and clearly tied to questionable 
instrumental-economic purposes. Section seven, on capitalism and 
instrumentalism, seeks to draw these strands together and account for the use 
of instrumental reasoning in current education policy, and concludes by 
suggesting that in Habermas’ notion of substantive rationality alternatives 
might be found. 
 
 
2. Hume’s instrumentalism 
 
Hume is renowned for his sceptical doubt about the limits of human reason 
and for his epistemological modesty: ‘Reason is, and ought only to be the 
slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve 
and obey them’ (Hume, 1973, p.458). If the function of reason is to serve an 
individual’s passions, and ‘since a passion can never, in any sense, be call’d 
unreasonable’, Hume surmised that ‘’tis impossible that reason and passion 
can ever oppose each other…’ (ibid. p.416). If these non-cognitive desires 
cannot be contrary to reason then, he concluded, ‘Tis not contrary to reason to 
prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger...’ 
(ibid. p.416). Because of this portrayal of reason, as a tool that discovers the 
best action to achieve a subject’s purposes, underpinned by a profound 
scepticism regarding the possibility of the rational deliberation of those 
purposes, some have concluded that ‘“Humean” now serves as a virtual 
synonym for “instrumentalist”’ (Setiya, 2004, p.365; see also Audi, 2002, 
p.236).  
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Some loyal Humeans have acknowledged pitfalls and lacunae within the 
master’s original account of reason but have sought to explain how it might 
be profitably reshaped (e.g. Baier, 1991, p.161; Setiya, 2004, p.370; Garrett, 
1997, p.95. See also Raz, 1986; Hubin, 2001; Audi, 2002; Lillehammer, 2007). 
While they have proffered arguments favouring modifications of the original 
depiction of reason, others have warned against tenuous reinterpretations. 
Hampton (1996, 1998) and Korsgaard (1997) for example have argued that 
such notions may sequester more fundamental problems at the heart of his 
instrumentalism. Their proposals are detailed, convoluted and distinct but 
both try to show how Humean reason is untenable precisely because it omits 
an explicit conception of what is right or just. They have argued that 
normativity is inescapable in a conception of instrumental reasoning and that 
this omission is sufficient to unravel the fallacy that reason can serve as an 
inert tool. Thus, they argue, in identifying passions considered important to a 
subject, instrumental reasoners still need to address the problem of coherence 
and the likelihood that subjective preferences may compete with each other; 
or that judgements will still need to made about whether, in the longer term, 
passions could be best maximised by temporary postponement now; or 
whether planning for the future could involve reason speculating about 
currently unfelt, but rationally perceivable, preferences. Thus, says 
Korsgaard, ‘in order to distinguish rational desire from actual desire, it looks 
as if we need to have some rational principles determining which ends are 
worthy of preference or pursuit’ (Korsgaard, 1997, p.230). Such rational 
principles, says Hampton, entail values that are in Hume assumed: ‘…any 
theory of instrumental reason is just as hip-deep in normativity as any moral 
theory, and therefore just as metaphysically problematic as any moral theory’ 
(Hampton, 1998, p.206). In short, if reason cannot deliver straightforward 
attachments to subjective preferences without making judgments between 
purposes and possible ends, Hume’s notion ‘that reason is perfectly inert’ 
(Hume, 1973, p.458) is untenable. Any moral theory based upon it faces an 
insuperable dilemma: ‘…the authority of this instrumental form has to be 
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understood non-instrumentally… understood as an imperative, it is 
categorical and not hypothetical’ (Hampton, 1998, p.140, note 22).  
 
Three observations are worth making. First, Hampton and Korsgaards’ 
critique has been accepted in part by a number of prominent Humeans (e.g. 
Millgram, 2000; Hubin, 2001; Beardman, 2007; Lillehammer, 2007). Second, 
despite the tendency for instrumentalists to ‘dislike the inclusion of norms in 
their theory’ (Hampton, 1998, p.198), there are good arguments to show that 
the purpose of reasoning beyond its instrumental function is inescapably tied 
to a normative agenda. And third, when Hume’s philosophy merges with 
social theory the problems associated with instrumentalism become more 
apparent. At the start of the Enquiry he acknowledged that his philosophical 
arguments bore no ‘direct reference to action and society’ (Hume, 1996, p.9). 
While latter parts of the Treatise contain discussion of what philosophy can do 
for society, Hume’s scepticism regarding the remit of reason prevented him 
from making clear connections between his philosophical ideas and the 
values that emerged in his musings on social, political and economic matters. 
Like his conservative companions Burke and Oakeshott, for Hume it was 
custom and tradition that would provide the appropriate guide to practical 
action. 
 
Others, however, are more sceptical of Hume’s philosophical legacy in social 
practice. Horkheimer described him as ‘the father of modern positivism’ for 
the way he ‘eliminated’ the visionary, transcendent qualities of reasoning 
prevalent in Greek and liberal epistemologies: ‘The acceptability of ideas, the 
criteria for our actions and beliefs, the leading principles of ethics and politics, 
all our ultimate decisions are made to depend upon factors other than reason’ 
(Horkheimer, 1974, p.6). Hampton has pointed to the way contemporary 
Humeans have often bypassed social and political questions by focussing on 
what she calls ‘trivial and whimsical’ preferences for inconsequential subject 
matter when discussing the vicissitudes of reason (Hampton, 1998, p.193). 
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Above we saw how Hume drove home his point about the limits of reason by 
equating the destruction of the world to the scratching of his finger. So too 
with contemporary Humeans where wanting to watch a film, go to a spa, play 
the piano, put parsley on the moon, have a drink or contemplate its 
prevention should a wasp fly into a vending machine’s coin slot, are the sorts 
of examples chosen to illustrate seemingly socially inconsequential 
discussions of reason (see Nagel, 1970; Hubin, 2001; Raz, 2005; Beardman, 
2007). Hampton’s accusation of triviality is an outcome of the prohibition of 
reason in the adjudication of more significant issues than these, permitted to 
deal with nothing more complex than the efficacy of solutions to everyday 
‘personal’ choices. Some have argued, however, that when instrumental 
reasoning is used to condone certain socio-economic practices, the 
consequences of a philosophy of ‘arbitrary preference’ (O’Neill, 1998) are less 
easy to ignore, and here Weber has been a target. 
 
 
3. Weber’s instrumentalism 
 
Weber’s reflections on the meaning of reason and rationality are scattered and 
unmethodical. They have been described as ‘confusing’ (Levine, 1981, p.13), 
‘fragmentary’ (Habermas, 1984, p.143, 170) or ‘ambiguous’ (Swidler, 1973, 
p.35). In The Protestant Ethic he acknowledged he had difficulty with the term 
(Weber, 1930 p.194, note 9) and in The Economic Ethics of the World Religions 
considered the ‘very different things’ that ‘‘rationalism’ can mean’ (Weber, 
1948, p.293-4; see Levine, 1981, p.23). However, in Economy and Society he 
wrote more clearly of four types: ‘traditional’, ‘affectual’, 
‘instrumental/formal’ (Zweckrationalität) and ‘value/substantive’ 
(Wertrationalität) rationality (Weber, 1968, p.24-5):  
The term “formal rationality of economic action” will be used to 
designate the extent of quantitative calculation… The concept of 
“substantive rationality”, on the other hand, is full of ambiguities. It 
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conveys … certain criteria of ultimate ends, whether they be ethical, 
political, utilitarian, hedonistic, feudal, egalitarian or whatever... (ibid., 
p.85-6).  
It is only Weber’s notion of ‘formal rationality’ that is of interest here. 
 
In The Protestant Ethic he reflected upon the portentous expansion of market 
forces under capitalism but concluded that they would do so anyway for 
humanity was entrapped by the laws of modernity. In the context of 
inexorable economic forces and the growing disenchantment with religion, 
human reason was denuded of any vestige of its former qualities in pre-
capitalist times: 
 Man is dominated by the making of money, by acquisition as the 
ultimate purpose of his life. Economic acquisition is no longer 
subordinated to man as the means for the satisfaction of his material 
needs. This reversal of what we should call the natural relationship, so 
irrational from a naïve point of view, is evidently as definitely a 
leading principle of capitalism as it is foreign to all people not under 
capitalistic influence. (Weber, 1930, p.53) 
With the constant expansion of science and technology that fed the rise of 
capitalism, along with adjudicating and administrative procedures at hand to 
establish the dependable regulation of business, Weber prophesised that 
‘progress’ towards the bureaucratic state was imminent. The rationalisation of 
society was leading to an ever increasing growth of a social and economic 
system whose values, ends and goals were irrational but unchangeable: ‘The 
capitalist economy of the present day is an immense cosmos into which the 
individual is born, and which presents itself to him …as an unalterable order 
of things in which he must live’ (ibid., p.54). Instrumental rationality had 
taken hold of the world and presented itself to humans as a necessary system 
where functional imperatives dominated. Weber described entrapment within 
this ‘iron cage’ (ibid. p.181-2) as ‘relentless’ (Weber, 1978, p.1156, 731), 
‘irresistible’ (Weber, 1978 p.1403), ‘unalterable’ (Weber, 1930, p.54), ‘escape 
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proof’ (ibid., p.1401-02) and ‘unavoidable’ (Weber, 1958, p.60). It was the 
structural condition of humanity in industrial nations that rationalisation 
would forever emend its efficiency and scope until ‘the last ton of fossilized 
coal is burnt’ (Weber, 1930, p.181). 
 
It was the universality of Weber’s depiction of the effects of instrumental 
reason upon the social fabric that raised the ire of Frankfurt School theorists. 
While they concurred with his analysis that Protestantism had been an 
important precursor for the development of capitalism and that capitalism 
had provided a matrix in which instrumental reason could flourish, Marcuse 
condemned him for presenting it in terms of historical fate: 
Who decrees the fate? ... Weber’s concept of fate is construed ‘after the 
fact’ of such coercion: he generalizes the blindness of a society which 
reproduces itself behind the back of individuals, of a society in which 
the law of domination appears as objective technological law. 
However, in fact, this law is neither “fatal” nor “formal”. The context 
of Weber’s analysis is the historical context in which economic reason 
became the reason of domination. (Marcuse, 1972, p.213-4) 
For Marcuse the rise of instrumental reason was not to blame per se for the 
‘chaotic, frightening and evil aspects of technological civilisation’ but the way 
in which the process of rationalization was organised under capitalism that 
accounted for the ‘irrationality of this rationalization’. Horkheimer similarly 
fought against the reduction of reason to a tool that fore-grounded means 
rather than ends and, in a Critique of Instrumental Reason, sought ‘to rescue 
thought from this fate’: 
 ‘Reason’ for a long period meant the activity of understanding and 
assimilating the eternal ideas which were to function as goals for men. 
Today, on the contrary, it is not only the business but the essential 
work of reason to find means for the goals one adopts at any given 
time… Reason is considered to come into its own when it rejects any 
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status as an absolute…and accepts itself simply as a tool… 
(Horkheimer, 1974, p.vii-viii) 
In short, Weber stood accused of fusing the apparent inexorable growth of 
instrumental reasoning with the progress of capitalism and by so doing 
arriving at the ideologically unacceptable position of foreclosure upon the 
possible emergence of historical and political alternatives. 
 
For Habermas, however, Marcuse and Horkheimer presented their 
‘unrelenting critique from the ironically distanced perspective of an objective 
reason that had fallen irreparably into ruin’ (Habermas, 1984, p.377). While 
their critique of Weber was valid, their explanatory model of rationality was 
flawed (Habermas, 1987, p.350). For Habermas a more convincing way was to 
redefine Weber’s Wertrationalität while retaining Zweckrationalität as a distinct 
but essential component of human reasoning (Habermas, 1971). Thus 
instrumental rationality was described as that which considered means and 
consequences in a quantifiable and calculable way, a form of rationality where 
actions were judged by the ultimate goal of maximum efficiency. In contrast, 
substantive (or ‘communicative’) rationality was said to be based upon 
principles of justice, fairness and truthfulness. This form of rationality entered 
people’s lives through their culture and community and was thus subject to 
the vagaries of particular customs and traditions of power. Thus whereas 
instrumental rationality had technical rules, substantive rationality rested 
upon social norms. Whereas instrumental rationality used context-free 
language, the language of mathematics, measurement and replication, 
substantive rationality rested upon inter-subjectively shared, everyday 
language. Whereas systems of instrumental rationality involved learning 
skills and manifesting formal qualifications to demonstrate scientific and 
technical prowess, substantive action drew upon internalised roles gained 
from convention and tradition: ‘skills put us in a position to solve problems’, 
traditions motivate us ‘to follow norms’. Transgressing the rules of 
instrumental rationality led to inefficiency while the failure of substantive 
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action involved the reprisal of authority. And whereas the rationalisation of 
systems of instrumental action involved the growth of productive or capitalist 
forces through the incessant, quasi-autonomous expansion of scientific and 
technical control, in communicative interactions there was the possibility of 
what Habermas called, albeit vaguely, emancipation. 
 
To sum up so far. First, the roots of instrumental reasoning can be found in 
elements of empiricist philosophy and social theory. Second, critics of 
instrumentalism in Hume (Korsgaard and Hampton) and in Weber (Marcuse 
and Horkheimer) have argued against the pretence that reason can be 
conceived as a means-seeking activity that presupposes human purposes that 
are ‘taken for granted and supposedly self-explanatory’. They are accused of 
secreting normative assumptions (in Hume) or ideological dispositions (in 
Weber) that go unacknowledged. Third, Habermas’ development of two 
forms of rationality provides a valuable model that extends Weber’s 
Wertrationalität while retaining Zweckrationalität as distinct components of 
human reasoning. The next three sections explain the rise of instrumental 
reasoning in current educational discourses.  
 
 
4.  Managerialism and instrumentalism 
 
Ball has argued that ‘new public management’ (NPM) has become ‘the key 
mechanism in the political reform and cultural re-engineering of public 
sectors for the last 20 years’ (Ball, 2008, p.47). One of the key terms in NPM 
has been ‘effective’, as in ‘effective school leadership’ (e.g. Teddlie and 
Reynolds, 2000). For some, however, the term is controversial. Bottery has 
suggested that ‘effective’ is a word normally taken to be a neutral term, 
something that simply describes a relationship between means and ends, and 
so has argued that the School Effectiveness Movement has facilitated the 
spurious belief that there was nothing problematic in their declarations. This, 
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he says, has enticed researchers to think of the study of the ‘effective school’ 
as a matter of mere empirical investigation: ‘…if there are no values involved, 
or if it is so evidently good, then all we need to do is get on and investigate it’ 
(Bottery, 2000, p.115). Similarly Blake et.al. have argued: ‘It is the notion of 
effectiveness, and its close relation efficiency, that have above all replaced 
proper consideration of ends’ (Blake, et.al., 1998, p132). Pring has likewise 
proposed that the effectiveness debate has severed educational from moral 
discourses resulting in ‘a theory of effectiveness which ignores the question 
“Effective for what?” ‘ (Pring, 2005, p.13). Again Wrigley has argued that 
research surrounding school effectiveness ‘avoids a debate about the purposes 
of education’ (Wrigley, 2006, p.35 my emphasis), that he also attributes to its 
successor, the School Improvement Movement, which is ‘virtually silent about 
the purpose of schooling’ and ‘gives rise to some very strange writing. Dozens 
of books are published every year about styles of leadership but few even 
consider where they are leading to’ (Wrigley, 2006, p.38). Managerialism is 
part of a culture where the devising of means has become a dominant activity 
and where ‘consideration of values, of the ends to which means lead, no 
longer takes pace to any significant extent…’ (Blake, et.al., 1998, p.133): 
Managers themselves and most writers about management conceive of 
themselves as morally neutral characters whose skills enable them to 
devise the most efficient means of achieving whatever end is proposed. 
Whether a given manager is effective or not is on the dominant view a 
quite different question from that of the morality of the ends which his 
effectiveness serves or fails to serve. Nonetheless there are strong 
grounds for rejecting the claim that effectiveness is a morally neutral 
value. (MacIntyre, 2007, p.74)  
In short, many observers are united in their judgement that the term 
‘effective’ has been used instrumentally as a means for excluding issues that 
might call into doubt the neutrality or self-evident goodness of desired 
changes in public policy, in this case management structures. 
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Since 2004 those wishing to become senior managers in state schools in 
England must hold, or be working towards, National Professional 
Qualifications for Headship (NPQH) for which they will be assessed against 
government determined Standards: ‘The Standards recognise the key role that 
headteachers play in engaging in the development and delivery of 
government policy and in raising and maintaining levels of attainment in 
schools in order to meet the needs of every child’ (DfES, 2004). The National 
Standards for Headteachers lists the qualities, activities and attributes necessary 
for the job:  
‘maintaining effective partnerships’  
‘shaping the future’  
‘create a productive learning community’  
‘ensuring that the school moves forward’  
‘carry the vision forward’  
‘the pursuit of excellence’  
‘develops and maintains effective strategies’ 
What is missing here is acknowledgement of the normative or substantive 
domain that would give meaning to implied purposes. For example, there are 
thirty eight references to the word effective but no explicit discussion of what 
the content of an ‘effective partnership’ might be. Similarly, there is no 
discussion about the values underlying disparate ‘visions’ Headteachers 
might have. Some may argue that a school ‘moving forward’ should ‘shape 
the future’ in one direction rather than another, driven, on the one hand, by a 
radical concern for the ecological catastrophe a Headteacher may think now 
faces the planet, or, on the other, by the need to create more students primed 
with qualities and skills to duplicate the existing trajectory. How these 
disparate ‘visions’ are to be evaluated goes unmentioned. In avoiding 
underlying purposes the National Standards for Headteachers employ a technical 
language that contains values that are indefinite or sustain an instrumental 
discourse that dodges issues of a substantive nature. These remain implicit 
and unstated. Together with NPM it gives the appearance of providing 
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technical solutions to educational problems and for some is clearly 
ideological: ‘New managerialism…is very clearly an ideological rather than 
simply a technical reform of higher education and one that is firmly based on 
interests concerning relations of power and dominance’ (Deem & Brehony, 
2005, p.231-2). For others it is a procedure for ‘keeping silent about human 
values’ and for strengthening an ideological position while reinforcing ‘the 
sense of inevitability and fatalism that neo-liberal politicians use to quell 
dissent’ (Wrigley, 2006 p.38). 
 
 
5. Skills and instrumentalism 
 
Under Fagin’s tutelage Oliver Twist was taught five skills for efficient pick-
pocketing. These were ‘nimbleness’, retreating from sight when closing upon 
a victim, the need for ‘extraordinary rapidity of movement’, the knack of 
accurate timing and developing appropriate reactions for ‘accidental 
stumbling’ (Dickens, 1966, page 54-5). But the skills revolve in a paradigm 
that is unquestioned. The substantive issue of thieving per se is placed outside 
the frame and Fagin’s reasoning appears instrumental because his education 
of Oliver involved merely the teaching of efficient methods of thieving bound 
to unquestioned purposes. 
 
In educational policy unstated assumptions about purposes are less 
convincing. Skills have always been an outcome of education but were 
conventionally viewed as its by-product. Today not only does the National 
Curriculum enshrine them in law (DfEE, 2000) but until recently the 
Department for Education and Skills championed the very term in its title. 
This has coincided with an anxiety about whether education ‘prepares young 
people adequately for the challenges of the new global economy’ (DfES, 
2005a) and the push to create a flexible, team-thinking, workforce suitably 
 15 
equipped to sustain the nation’s economic future within an unpredictable 
global context:  
Skills are fundamental to achieving our ambitions, as individuals, for 
our families and for our communities. They help businesses create 
wealth, and they help people realise their potential. So they serve the 
twin goals of social justice and economic success’ (DfES, 2005a, para 1; 
see also DfES, 2005b).  
Whether skills divorced from specific bodies of knowledge or physical 
challenges are transferable is a debate that has gone on elsewhere. The 
concern here is merely to establish how skills are linked with instrumental 
reasoning.  
 
 
Take ‘communication skills’, the first of the Key Skills in the National 
Curriculum (DfEE, 2000, p.20-1). Communication skills are commonly 
presented as a conduit devoid of content, that is to say, not communication 
about an issue or the substance of something but, rather, about the transferable, 
content-less skill of communication. The substantive issues contained in 
communication are often assumed to reside elsewhere. British Telecom, for 
example, in its education initiative Communication Skills for Life (BT, 2006), 
claim that its aims are: ‘To help everyone in the UK understand and enjoy the 
benefits of improved communication skills’. What it omits to explain is how 
such understanding, benefit and improvements might be measured in terms 
of political or moral criteria. It aims ‘to make a difference’, but to whom and 
why are issues not raised. BT aspires to get communicators ‘constantly 
engaged’ but refuses to explain for what reason, nor that the contested nature 
of engagement is often highly problematic. It values communicators who are 
‘open to ideas, opinions and questions’, but whether this openness would 
extend to argument about poor ideas or merely to the reception of any ideas, no 
matter what their content, remains highly ambiguous. In short, BT’s portrayal 
of communication skills proffers no epistemological concern for the content of 
ideas and, in the absence of a position about how contested values might be 
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communicated, mechanisms to ensure politeness and tolerance substitute for 
a complex explanation of how substantive disputes might be resolved. It is, in 
short, an instrumental view of communication that contains, in both senses, a 
normative agenda. 
 
In fact the proximity of ‘communication’ with ‘skill’ overflows with values 
embedded in political and cultural practices:  
…the phrase ‘communication skill’ names a cultural construct, not a 
natural phenomenon with an objective existence in the world. Whether 
some person, or group of people, has good, bad or indifferent 
communication skills is entirely dependent on what ‘communication’ is 
taken to be, and what is thought to constitute ‘skill’ in it. (Cameron, 
2000, p.128) 
Thus the same discursive features of communication could be seen as a skill in 
one historical period or culture but as pathological in another. Argument, for 
example, in a primary classroom in Russia is currently assumed to be a 
valuable skill (Alexander, 2001) but less so in English primary schools today 
where non-judgementalism has emerged as culturally more valuable in 
practices like ‘circle time’ (Middlesbrough EiC Partnership, 2006) and ‘peer 
mediation’: ‘One of the most crucial components of the mediation process is 
that it remains non-judgemental’ (Holmes, 2006; see also Teachernet, 2006). In 
short, the content of communication skills varies from age to age and from 
culture to culture, and the façade of neutrality is revealed by historical 
evidence of shifts in content and by a comparison of assumptions from 
different contemporary practices. 
 
Moreover, the contemporary preference for non-judgementalism as a 
communicative skill in education in England is itself both revealing and 
problematic. On the one hand, such a skill in, say, peer mentoring could be 
seen as replicating therapy-like discourses that resolve everyday conflicts in 
school without the construction of winners or losers, where questions of right 
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and wrong are deemed unimportant in the quest to move forward in 
pragmatic and effective response. On the other hand, such practices could be 
seen as examples of discourses structured to undermine or bypass the search 
for the truth about particular instances of bullying and, in refusing to isolate 
culprits, gloss over issues of social justice in the haste for closure.  
 
These problems are mirrored in contemporary advice about classroom 
discussion concerning the teaching of financial skills. DfEE guidance suggests 
that teachers should ‘listen carefully to what everyone has to say, valuing all 
contributions non-judgementally so that young people from different 
financial backgrounds are able to contribute to discussions on an equal 
footing and with equal confidence’ (DfEE, 2000, p.12). Such pedagogical 
advice could be seen as appropriate and sensitive and avoid the 
embarrassment that a pupil may feel when encountering other pupils from 
‘different financial circumstances’ (ibid. p.9&11). Equally it could be seen as 
serving to preclude discussion of structural inequalities where the values 
associated with comparative wealth are placed beyond enquiry and 
judgement. Moreover, it places the broader political agenda underpinning the 
introduction of financial skills in English schools in recent years beyond 
question (see Gibson, 2008) and runs counters the broader liberal justification 
for reasoning by presupposing that the world is already wise, fair and just 
(see Cameron, 2000).  
 
 
6. Creativity and instrumentalism 
 
A distinction can be made between an individualised, romantic notion of 
creativity, to which teachers have recently turned as a tonic for years of 
national over-governance of the school curriculum in England (see Roling, 
2004), and an instrumental one, that binds it to the economic needs of the 
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nation. PM Blair, in his Forward to Culture and Creativity, drew upon both 
these strands: 
This Government knows that culture and creativity matter. They 
matter because they can enrich all our lives, and everyone deserves the 
opportunity to develop their own creative talents and to benefit from 
those of others… They also matter because creative talent will be 
crucial to our individual and national economic success in the economy 
of the future.  
(Blair, 2001. See also Miliband, 2003; Smith, 2003; Holden, 2004) 
While both depictions of creativity are controversial (see Gibson, 2005) it is 
merely the latter that is of concern here. 
 
Harnessing the word creativity to the needs of the economy means that it is 
being employed instrumentally. The problem with the instrumentalisation of 
creativity is that it can be filled with any content and used to support any 
political purpose, agenda or vision of the future, or rather, presumes one that 
then becomes second-order and unsubstantiated:  
Our system of education is predicated on old assumptions about the 
supply and demand for labour. New models of education for the post-
industrial economies are struggling to emerge in many parts of the 
world. These models are being shaped by new patterns of work, by the 
accelerated impact of technologies and by new ways of living. 
(Robinson, 2004) 
Seltzer & Bentley in The Creative Age: Knowledge and skills for the new economy 
(1999) made a similar case for creativity in education. Taking Unipart as the 
exemplar of modernisation since its apparent turn to creative ways of 
engaging the workforce, we are told that profits rose substantially:  
In 1998, Unipart had its seventh consecutive year of record breaking 
growth with sales exceeding £1.1 billion… At Unipart, creativity seems 
to come naturally – not because employees are expected to take a 
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course on creativity and problem-solving, but because there is virtually 
nowhere in the life of the firm where creative learning is set aside…  
(Seltzer & Bentley, 1999) 
In short, the politico-economist’s concern for creativity lies in the way it 
bridges financial and educational policy, while less well-disguised texts link 
creativity openly with profit. 
 
However, if Habermas is right in theorising how advanced capitalist societies 
are too often governed by instrumental actions associated with science and 
technology augmented way beyond their appropriate domain, then use of 
creativity to support that project throws its validity into question. If Blair, 
Miliband, Smith, Holden, Selzer & Bentley, et al. link creativity to the future 
needs of the economy in the absence of a substantive debate about the 
‘rightness of norms’, to use Habermas’ term, their view is at best ambivalent 
and at worse verifies Hertz’s Weberian view of the takeover of democracy by 
capitalism (Hertz, 2001). This is not to imply that instrumental reasoning is 
improper or un-useful. In its apparent inertness it realises defined goals under 
given conditions. It ensures the efficient construction of runways, the 
technical smartness of identity cards, the scientific possibility of genetically 
modified crops, manages the effective deployment of troops in combat, and so 
on. But while instrumental action organises the means that are appropriate 
according to the effective control of predetermined purposes, substantive 
action demands the reasoned appraisal of normatively valued alternatives, 
namely, the appetite for runways, identity cards, GM crops or war. Creativity 
can serve both forms of rationality. It can serve the technical sophistication of 
solutions to preordained crises of a personal, technical, military or profitable 
nature. But it can also serve the inter-subjective reasoning about complex 
goals and the search for the rightness of underlying values. 
 
 
7. Capitalism and instrumentalism 
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These educational discourses on managerialism, skills and creativity 
exemplify instrumental reasoning in practice. The paper has suggested that 
their current presentation sidelines reflection upon substantive assumptions 
by disengagement from epistemic and normative realms that underpin and 
sustain them. Issues of purpose and value are presented as unproblematic, 
‘taken for granted and supposedly self-explanatory’ (Horkheimer, 2004, p.3), 
and consensus and agreement too often feigned or contrived. The paper has 
argued that beyond their instrumental function they are necessarily tied to a 
normative agenda, are ‘hip-deep in normativity’ to use Hampton’s phrase, 
but are reticent to acknowledge their moral or political a priori. 
 
In 1972 Marcuse proposed that Weber’s instrumental rationality coincided 
with what he termed ‘capitalist rationality’ in so far as its purpose was 
calculable efficiency and profit: 
…its rationality organizes and controls things and men, factory and 
bureaucracy, work and leisure. But to what purpose does it control 
them? Up to this point, Weber’s concept of reason has been ‘formal’... 
But now the limits of formal reason emerge: neither the specific 
purpose of the scientific-technical construction nor its materials (its 
subjects and objects) can be deduced from the concept of reason; they 
explode from the start this formal, ‘value-free’ concept. (Marcuse, 1972, 
p.205-6. See also McGuigan, 2006, p.14; Habermas, 1971, p.82; Lyotard, 
1984, p.12) 
Capitalist rationality can help explain the emergence of instrumental 
reasoning in managerialism, skills and creativity. In managerial discourses the 
paper has suggested that ‘talk of effectiveness is not so agnostic about ends as 
it pretends’ (Blake et.al., 1998, p.132) and that substantive values are imported 
under the guise of ethical neutrality. Arguably, these sequestered ends are 
associated with compliance and efficiency and the crucial requirement of 
capitalism to minimise cost is in part secured by efficiency gains through the 
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effective management, surveillance and social adjustment of the labour 
market. For some this would help explain the de-politicisation of the public 
sphere as a site of potential instability as well as the associated fragmentation 
of communities and crises of political legitimation (see Taylor, 1992; 
Habermas, 1988). For others managerialism is a facet of capitalism that is 
‘inseparable from a mode of human existence in which the contrivance of 
means is in central part the manipulation of human beings into compliant 
patterns of behaviour’ (MacIntyre, 2007 p.74). This, for MacIntyre, is the moral 
and political a priori underpinning managerialism, its unclaimed purpose.  
 
Capitalist rationality also underpins skill development and is evidenced when 
accounting for historical shifts in content. The paper has argued that ‘good 
communication skills’ today preference linguistic behaviours commonly 
associated with girls, whereas boys in the past were thought ‘more likely to 
argue openly and to voice strong opinions’ (see OFSTED, 1993; QCA, 1998). 
But the transformation over the past two decades, of enabling female students 
to become more assertive to today’s dominant paradigm were boys are 
required to become ‘better’ communicators by becoming less judgemental, 
can also be linked with labour and employability. The current content of 
communication skills may not simply be associated with ‘feminised language’ 
but reflect a more general cultural shift concerning the manufacturing of the 
flexible worker and the responsible citizen (see Cameron, 2000; Cameron, 
2008). In other words, the instrumental take on communication skills in 
education may actually be part of a broader response to an employability 
agenda where members of either sex are required not only to be economically 
creative and technically skilled but compliant ‘team players’, collegiate in 
their outlook and predisposed to communicative compromise, rather than 
argue a case or contest assumed values. Capitalist rationality demands it: 
‘Employers are usually best placed to judge how to develop their business, 
and what skills their current and future employees will need. Training is 
more likely to have an impact if the employer is engaged in its design and 
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delivery, and is motivated to deploy the new skills effectively’ (DfES, 2005a, 
para.52-3; see also CBI/Universities UK, 2009).  
 
The political a priori underlying government initiatives on creativity are also 
explicable in terms of capitalist rationality. What is curious is that they have 
consistently advocated the need to identify value and purpose. The definition 
found in All Our Futures (DfEE, 1999) and repeated in OFSTED’s Expecting the 
Unexpected (2003), links creativity with value quite explicitly. Creativity is 
‘imaginative activity fashioned so as to produce outcomes that are both 
original and of value’. But discussion of what is of value is omitted. The 
purpose is left free-floating. Selzer and Bentley too see the importance of 
linking creativity with value: ‘Creativity is the application of knowledge and 
skills in new ways to achieve a valued goal’. But, in the absence of any 
sustained epistemological or ethical discussion of what are valued goals, 
creativity appears supine to the needs of the economy with education policy 
at heel: ‘…to boost competitiveness in the knowledge economy, we must 
make radical changes to the educational system’ (Selzer & Bentley, 1999). 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Habermas has argued that ‘in modern societies, economic and bureaucratic 
spheres emerge in which social relations are regulated only via money and 
power’ (Habermas, 1987, p.154). This he has explained in terms of the 
uncoupling of the economic and bureaucratic ‘system’ from the ‘lifeworld’, 
the place where substantive rationality should mediate norms, identities and 
social traditions. This has led to a withering of the sphere in which liberal 
notions of reasoning were meant to operate, the domain where contestation, 
refutation and argument were to intended to judge between competing 
purposes. He has not written extensively about the way education is involved 
in ratifying or opposing this trend. Others, however, have suggested that his 
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idea of the colonization of the Lebenswelt can help explain how education has 
increasingly become ‘a vehicle for maintaining or enhancing the nation’s 
economy’ and how ‘teaching, leaning and the curriculum are …themselves 
increasingly shaped by the model of economic exchange’ (Deakin Crick & 
Joldersma, 2007, p.82. See also Young, 1989). Others have argued that his idea 
of procedural rationality and participatory democracy could provide a basis 
for restructuring the prevalent tradition of teacher/pupil interaction in 
England and for transforming pupil voice into the ‘unforced reciprocal 
recognition of students-as-fellow-inquirers’ (Young, 2000, p.541. See also 
Englund, 2010). This would involve a shift from a tradition where individuals 
expressed ‘personal’ opinions to one that prepared them for informed and 
committed contestation within inter-subjective contexts through ‘the 
improvement of the methods and conditions for debate, discussion and 
persuasion’ (Habermas, 1996, p.304). Again, others have focussed on the 
normative core within substantive rationality and the need for education to 
shift from its current preoccupation with the development of skills and 
cognitive abilities in preparation for employment, to the development of 
students’ preparedness to make value-judgements about the world (see 
Habermas, 1979, p.84-5. See also Carleheden, 2006). In these sorts of ways 
education would help engender what Habermas has called the epistemic need 
for the ‘persistent critique’ of latent purposes that exposed the substance of 
human reasoning (Habermas, 1984, p.345), reversing a trend that has today 
‘reduced reason to a potential for knowledge that has lost, together with its 
critical sting, its commitment, its moral decisiveness and has been separated 
from such a decision as from an alien element’ (Habermas, 1974, p.258). 
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